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Abstract
We study how financial distress of a significant customer impacts capital structure of suppliers.
Using a sample of U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1980 and 2013, we find that the
suppliers of these firms increase their leverage ratio over the two years prior to the filing date.
This change is economically significant and consistent with the bargaining power theory, which
states that an increase in suppliers’ debt decreases the surplus available for negotiations.
Therefore, suppliers increase their financing leverage to fortify their bargaining power with
significant, distressed customers. We also find evidence that suppliers reduce their leverage after
the customer reorganizes its liabilities and capital structure in the Chapter 11 process, indicating
a return to a previous status quo.
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1. Introduction
The imbalance of bargaining power that exists between a supplier and a large client can
influence the supplier’s corporate policy and even foster abusive buying practices. Demanding
retrospective payments, extra discounts, after-sale rebates, late payments, and/or return of unsold
goods to suppliers are some of the examples of how large clients can increase uncertainty for and
affect suppliers financially. The importance of such influence by large clients on their suppliers
has become more significant during and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, during which
many of the United States’ biggest companies experienced financial distress and moved toward
more aggressive cash management practices. Putting more pressure on their small and powerless
suppliers by adding to the amount of time it takes to pay them seems to be one of the most
practical solutions they came up with as part of such practices. Referring to Procter & Gamble’s
supplier relationship management in the aftermath of the financial crisis, for example, the Wall
Street Journal notes, “companies that hold on to cash longer create deficits at suppliers that have
to find financing, raise prices or squeeze other firms along the supply chain. Smaller companies
with little bargaining power and less access to credit ultimately could see their costs rise,
pinching funds that could otherwise be spent on hiring or investments.”3 In this paper, we study
one of the mechanisms suppliers have to balance this bargaining power. We investigate how
suppliers increase their bargaining power by strategically altering their capital structure in
response to change in the riskiness of a major customer in anticipation of the customer’s distress.
To that end, we provide new insights as part of the literature that highlights the importance of
supplier-customer relationship in determining the capital structure of the supplier.
A traditional approach in investigating the determinants of capital structure policy has
been the identification of firm and market characteristics that can explain the observed level of
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corporate debt (Parsons and Titman, 2008). Extending this view, Titman (1984), Bronars and
Deere (1991), and Perotti and Spier (1993), among others, investigate the possibilities of
additional factors that might impact capital structure decisions. These factors are related to a
firm’s competitive position and the strategy it employs in its relationships with its nonfinancial
stakeholders, such as employees, competitors, customers, and suppliers. Building on this
literature, we examine how a supplier adjusts its debt level in response to the impending financial
distress of a significant customer (defined as a customer that accounts for at least 10% of a
supplier firm’s annual sales).
We hypothesize that the supplier reacts to a customer’s distress by increasing its debt
level in order to fortify its bargaining position. The bargaining theory (Bronars and Deere, 1991)
states that the firm increases its debt when the bargaining power of its counterparty increases in
order to reduce the amount of surplus available in a negotiation. This theory is supported by
evidence on firms that increase their debt levels when facing negotiations with strong
nonfinancial stakeholders such as unions (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Matsa, 2010). In our
setting, the main concern for the supplier is to keep its strategic negotiation position as strong as
possible if it believes that the customer has substantial chances of recovery. Suppliers’
bargaining power is especially relevant because distressed customers may be pressing their
suppliers to give better trade conditions such as reducing prices or extending credit. The implicit
assumption is that in this extreme situation, other considerations for the choice of capital
structure, such as the relation-specific investment theory from Titman (1984) and Titman and
Wessels (1988), are less relevant.4 Additionally, we hypothesize that this strategic negotiation
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Relation-specific investment theory states that suppliers and customers choose their capital structure in order to
minimize costs of distress in a possible future situation. In our setting, the customer is already in distress in the years
preceding Chapter 11 filing, and bargaining power considerations during upcoming contract negotiations are more
relevant for leverage decisions.
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move is temporary, with the supplier returning to a previous relative status quo when the
distressed customer reemerges from Chapter 11 after reorganization.
We analyze the changes in capital structure of suppliers during a period of customer
financial distress. We construct the sample of such suppliers using comprehensive data on
reported supplier-customer relationships from the Compustat Customer Segment database and
bankruptcy filings between 1980 and 2013 from the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database.
We document empirical evidence that suppliers of distressed customers use an increase in debt as
a strategic tool to keep or improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis distressed customers in the
two years before the customers file for Chapter 11, provided that the customers reorganize and
reemerge from Chapter 11. We also find evidence of reduction in their debt levels after the
customers reorganize in Chapter 11, indicating that the strategic negotiation move was
temporary.
Another possible explanation for the observed increase in supplier leverage is that
suppliers act as liquidity providers to their important customers in distress. Under this
explanation, suppliers borrow to finance additional trade credit to their distressed customers that
cannot obtain financing on their own. If this trade credit is the underlying mechanism we would
also observe a temporary increase in the supplier’s total debt because of the increase in the
supplier’s current liabilities. We discriminate between the trade credit and bargaining power
hypotheses by examining the behavior of both short-term and long-term debt ratios. Based on the
bargaining power explanation, suppliers are interested in arguing during renegotiations that they
do not have the flexibility to offer better prices and that their ability to extend credit is limited
because they have to meet their own debt obligations. Consequently, these suppliers increase not
only their short-term debt but also their long-term debt obligations to generate more credibility
during negotiations with a distressed client about their leverage induced constraints. In contrast,
4

if the trade credit channel is the reason for the increase in suppliers’ leverage, it should result in
increases in short-term debt ratios rather than long-term debt ratios. Consistent with this
reasoning, we first document that while suppliers’ short-term debt ratio is positively related to
their accounts receivable ratio, their long-term debt ratio is unrelated to the trade credit they
provide to their customers. Thus, while increases in trade credit may potentially account for
increases in the short-term debt ratio, it is unlikely to explain changes in the long-term debt ratio.
We show that there is a statistically significant increase in both the suppliers’ short-term
and long-term debt ratios during the customers’ distress years. While the increase in long-term
debt ratios supports the bargaining power hypothesis, it is unclear whether the increase in shortterm debt ratio is driven by the trade credit mechanism or bargaining power considerations or
both. We explore this issue in two ways.
First, we examine whether there is an unusual increase in suppliers’ accounts receivable
ratios when a significant customer is in financial distress. Employing control variables identified
in prior empirical studies of trade credit, we find no unusual increase in suppliers’ trade credit
when the customer is in financial distress. This result raises doubts about the trade credit based
explanation of the observed increase in leverage prior to customer bankruptcy.
Second, we conduct a more detailed examination by using a two-stage model to explicitly
control for the impact of unusual changes in the accounts receivable ratio on the various leverage
measures. In the first-stage, we estimate the abnormal level of the accounts receivable ratio after
controlling for determinants other than leverage that have been identified in the prior literature
on trade credit; in the second stage, we include the measure of abnormal accounts receivable as
an additional control variable in our analysis of financial leverage during customer financial
distress. The analysis reveals a significant increase in both short-term and long-term financial
leverage during financial distress of a significant customer even after controlling for the impact
5

of changes in the suppliers’ trade credit. There is no diminution of the increase in the short-term
debt ratio during customer financial distress when the abnormal accounts receivable ratio is
added as an explanatory variable; the statistical significance of the leverage increase is however
much stronger for long-term leverage compared to short-term leverage. This result points
strongly to the role of bargaining considerations as an important driver of supplier financial
leverage during periods of customer financial distress.
We conduct a number of robustness tests to support our conclusions about the bargaining
power hypothesis. We use a benchmark sample to test whether other factors can be driving our
results, such as changes in leverage attributable to the dynamics in the supplier’s industry rather
than customer financial distress. Benchmark suppliers in the same industries as treatment
suppliers do not change their leverage during the years of interest if they do not have a business
relationship with a distressed customer. Next, we examine the impact of supplier industry
concentration. If the supplier’s industry is concentrated, the supplier should possess higher
bargaining power and is less likely to resort to increasing leverage in order to boost its
bargaining power with a distressed customer. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that greater
concentration in the supplier’s industry is associated with lower increases in the supplier’s debt.
Furthermore, we argue that suppliers assess the ex-ante probability of continuing the
business relationship with the distressed customers while deciding on appropriate capital
structure responses. If a customer is likely to be liquidated, the supplier will not bother to
increase financial leverage. Consistent with this reasoning, in the case of customers that are
liquidated after filing for Chapter 11, we find no evidence of changes in the suppliers’ debt level.
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that financial leverage is used as a
tool to determine how economic rents are divided between suppliers and customers. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the
6

data, the sample construction method, and the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and
analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Literature review
Our paper builds on a series of related papers on the effects of distress and bankruptcy on
external stakeholders. Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate the effect of bankruptcy announcements
(Chapter 11 filing) on the equity value of a firm’s competitors. They find significant effects,
either positive or negative, depending primarily on the degree of concentration or leverage in the
industry. They call this effect a “contagion effect” when it is negative and a “competitive effect”
when it is positive. They argue that the latter is driven by an increase in market power of the
surviving competitors. Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997) extend this empirical research by
examining the extent to which a firm’s bankruptcy impacts the valuation of its competitors,
finding contagion effects for large and small firm bankruptcies but not finding competitive
effects on the days centered around the Chapter 11 announcements. Slovin, Sushka, and
Polonchek (1999) find both contagion and competitive effects in the banking industry. Hertzel,
Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) investigate the valuation implications of distress and bankruptcy
on suppliers and customers of distressed firms, as well as how these effects interact with the
wealth effects for industry rivals. They find that there are significant prefiling and filing date
contagion effects extending not only to competitors but also to suppliers of the bankrupt firm.5
Moreover, they find that suppliers’ contagion effects are more severe when the intra-industry
competitors of the filing firm also suffer contagion.
Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian (2015) study the nature of “spillover effects” of financial
distress, where distress of a given firm is associated with negative equity returns to rivals,
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suppliers, and customers. They measure the extent to which expected costs of replacing a
distressed customer explain spillover costs for suppliers. They find that selling, general, and
administrative (SGA) costs of suppliers increase, reducing their profitability during the year of
the customer’s bankruptcy filing. Based on further analysis, they report that suppliers to
financially distressed companies that are highly likely to reorganize in bankruptcy incur little or
no spillover costs. However, suppliers to economically (rather than financially) distressed firms
experience large losses in market value, which are linked to proxies for the cost of replacing their
bankrupt customer. These papers assume a passive role for suppliers’ financial policy. Our paper
extends this literature by exploring an additional channel in which a major customer’s distress
affects suppliers, namely the suppliers’ capital structure. Specifically, we investigate whether
suppliers strategically increase leverage in order to countervail the bargaining power of
significant, distressed customers.
This paper is related to the work on the impact of supplier-customer strategic
relationships on corporate capital structure. Titman’s (1984) seminal paper argues that switching
costs are uniquely high when the supplier’s products are specific to the relationship and the
supplier is liquidated. He shows that these costs affect the supplier’s choice of capital structure,
and the supplier commits to a liquidation policy (lower leverage levels) that takes into account
the effects on its customers. Titman and Wessels (1988) also argue that firms in durable goods
industries choose lower leverage to assuage customer concerns; forced liquidation of suppliers
imposes costs on their customers that have to switch suppliers.
Providing empirical evidence consistent with the arguments of Titman (1984) and Titman
and Wessels (1988), Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) show that firms in bilateral
relationships are likely to produce or procure unique products, especially when they are in
durable goods industries, and that such firms maintain lower leverage. Kale and Shahrur (2007)
8

also find empirical evidence that firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism that
enables customers and suppliers to undertake relation-specific investments. Therefore, the
relation-specific investment theory argues that debt is harmful in enticing investments specific to
the supplier-customer relationship. Thus, the supplier will decrease its leverage if a significant
customer increases leverage to reduce the risk of relationship-specific investments. Such
reactions lead to a negative relation between supplier and customer debt levels.
Espousing a different view, several researchers (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Bronars and
Deere, 1991; Chu, 2012; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Hennessy and Livdan, 2009; Matsa,
2010) develop and test the bargaining theory arguments in the context of a firm’s financial
leverage decision. This theory states that when a firm increases its leverage, it increases its
bargaining power with its customers and suppliers. Consequently, the bargaining theory predicts
a positive leverage relationship between suppliers and customers in contrast with the relationspecific investment theory of Titman (1984). For instance, if a customer increases its leverage, it
increases its bargaining power with its suppliers. The suppliers may respond by increasing their
own leverage in order to not lose their bargaining power. Kale and Shahrur (2007) investigate the
bargaining role for debt and find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of
concentration in supplier/customer industries, which proxies for bargaining power. Brown, Fee
and Thomas (2009) find that suppliers experience significantly negative abnormal returns at the
announcements of customer leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Their argument is that LBO creates an
opportunity for a firm to extract concessions from its suppliers because of the improved
bargaining power conferred by higher leverage. Towner (2015) uses the health-care industry to
test the bargaining power theory and its effectiveness. He shows that reimbursement rates
negotiated between a hospital and insurers for a specific procedure are higher when the hospital
has more debt. He also shows that this effect is stronger when hospitals have less ex ante
9

bargaining power relative to insurers and that hospitals take on more debt when they have less
bargaining power.
Chu and Wang (2011) test both the bargaining power and relation-specific investment
theories and find that the positive leverage relationship is dominant and significant, but also that
the positive relationship is weaker if it requires more relation-specific investments, thus
confirming the existence of both phenomena. Demirci (2013) investigates the notion that
customer risk is an important determinant of suppliers’ financing decisions. She uses customers’
credit ratings, stock return volatility, and industry-adjusted book leverage as proxies of
customers’ risks to identify the impact on suppliers’ leverage and net debt issuance. She finds
that when customer risk is proxied by credit ratings or stock return volatility, it has a negative
impact on supplier’s debt financing, and that young firms and firms operating in concentrated
industries are more sensitive to changes in customer risk. However, in contrast to Chu and Wang
(2011), she does not find a statistically significant relationship between customer book leverage
and supplier book leverage in her sample. Our paper is different from these studies in that we
focus on a time window of acute customer financial distress during which bargaining power in
contract renegotiations assumes added importance for suppliers’ leverage decisions.
An alternative channel through which a supplier’s capital structure is affected by its
relationship with a customer is through trade credit provision (Cunat, 2006; Fisman and Love,
2003; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2011; Ng, Smith, and Smith, 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997).
Petersen and Rajan (1997) distinguish between large suppliers and small suppliers. They argue
that large suppliers have financing advantages. That is, they can receive bank loan more easily
and at a cheaper price than their customers. Also by routinely monitoring repayments, these
suppliers have better information about their customer than lending financial institutions do.
Further, Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that suppliers that are more creditworthy and have
10

access to financing offer more trade credit. Lastly, small suppliers provide less trade credit.
Gathering information on credit terms offered by suppliers by using survey data, Ng, Smith and
Smith (1999) find that credit terms between suppliers and customers are industry-specific, and
that these terms are stable over time. The authors conclude that information asymmetries
between suppliers and their customers and customers’ reputation are important in the design of
trade credit contracts. Ng et al. (1999), however, do not find results consistent with the theories
of trade credit that suggest liquidity of the supplier is a primary determinant in the decision to
extend credit, nor did they find support for the notion that suppliers who face variable demand
prefer to alter credit terms in lieu of price to deal with fluctuations. Comparing trade credit with
bank credit, Cunat (2006) finds that the relatively high implicit interest rates of trade credit are
the result of insurance and default premiums that are amplified whenever suppliers face a
relatively high cost of funds. Implicitly assuming large suppliers dealing with small customers,
the author finds that suppliers have a comparative advantage over banks in enforcing their
contracts because they are able to stop the supply of intermediate goods.
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011) provide the most relevant work. Using 30,000 actual
trade credit contracts between small suppliers and large buyers in the United States and Europe,
they test the validity of existing theories in the trade credit literature. This paper is relevant
because like them, our sample includes a few large clients and a larger number of relatively
small suppliers. Looking at both sides of the contract in their data set, they argue that because
suppliers that extend credit are generally small, lesser-known firms they are unlikely to have
access to cheaper financing. Rejecting the financing advantage argument, they provide
alternative explanations for why these suppliers should extend credit to larger borrowers. Trade
credit is a means for suppliers to provide a warranty assuring customers of product quality. They
also conclude that trade credit provides a means for the buyer to exercise market power and to
11

squeeze smaller suppliers. This evidence indicates that the supplier-customer financial
relationship is influenced by bargaining considerations.

3. Data
3.1. Sample construction
We use the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (hereafter, bankruptcy data set) to
identify all Chapter 11 filings between 1980 and 2013 (980 filings).6 The firms in the bankruptcy
data set have assets of at least $100 million in 1980 dollars at the time of filing, and each has at
least one publicly traded security. We match these firms to all firms reported as significant
customers in the Compustat Customer Segment database (hereafter, customer data set).
The customer data set contains the list of significant customers, defined as a firm that
accounts for at least 10% of the total sales revenue of a supplier. This requirement was
established by the SEC under FASB 14 (1976). As of January 1998, under FASB 131 (1997),
firms are no longer required to report the identity of their principal customers, but they still need
to report the sales to each of them; many firms continue to disclose the identity of their principal
customers voluntarily.
Significant customers are identified only by their names, which are sometimes
abbreviated. Therefore, we run the “reclink” Stata algorithm to match customer names in the
customer data set with the firms that filed for Chapter 11 and manually inspect all matches for
accuracy.7 Our matched sample includes 6,516 pair-year observations. We look for matches up
to 10 years before and after the Chapter 11 filing date, following Hertzel et al. (2008) and Kolay
et al. (2015). We gather financial data for all firms from the Compustat Fundamental Annual
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database from 1980 to 2013. We require that all firms have non-missing data for the variables
used in the subsequent analyses (these variables are described in Section 3.3). We identify 795
suppliers to 207 customers that filed for bankruptcy.
We exclude suppliers in the following industry classifications: utilities, financials, and
public administration (SIC codes 4900–4999, 6000–6999 and 9000–9999). After this step, we
have 751 suppliers with 195 bankrupt customers.8 Following Li and Tang (2016) and Demirci
(2013), we conservatively discard all supplier-customer pairs that have only one or two years of
matching to filter out temporary/short-lived relationships. We obtain 386 supplier-customer pairs
with long-standing reported relationships of three years or more. This sample contains 358
suppliers and 94 filing customers.9

3.1.1. Identification of financial distress
Because we want to examine the leverage of suppliers during the period of customers’
distress, we must first identify customer distress years. Figure 1 with the number line indicates
our dating convention. The numbers correspond to the end of each fiscal year for the supplier.
“F” denotes the Chapter 11 filing date of a significant customer, which occurs between end of
fiscal years –1 and 0. Thus, the supplier’s Year -2 financial leverage is observed anywhere
between 12 and 24 months before the customer’s bankruptcy filing date. In our sample, we
require a supplier-customer relationship reported in at least one of the three years: –2, –1, and 0.
This additional condition generates our final treatment sample with 156 suppliers and 62
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We include customers that are in finance and utilities industries in our sample following Hertzel et al. (2008) and
Kolay et al. (2015). Because we focus on the effects on their suppliers rather than on the filing customers
themselves, we do not expect their different treatment under Chapter 11 to affect our results. Nevertheless, we repeat
our tests after dropping these customers and find that results remain qualitatively unchanged.
9
The imposition of a minimum of three years of reported relationships is the key difference compared to Kolay, et
al. (2015); otherwise, we get a similar sample size.
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customers. We consider years –2 and –1 as customer distress years, per the discussion below.
Year 0 is considered as a transition year between distress and the start of reorganization.
Figure 1
Dating convention of key years examined in the analysis.
–2

–1

0
F

Hertzel et al. (2008) identify the firm distress day by the date of the most significant
abnormal drop in the market value of the filing firm in the preceding year leading up to the
bankruptcy filing, which in our convention could be located in year –1 or year 0. Kolay et al.
(2015) focus on the date where information about distress is released prior to Chapter 11, and
they search LexisNexis for the first announcement that the firm is negotiating or has already
negotiated with creditors, or has defaulted. Using this methodology, they find that on average, a
firm’s distress announcement date occurs 99 days after the value loss day advocated by Hertzel
et al. (2008). Kolay et al. (2015) measure filing customers’ characteristics using Compustat data
in the two years preceding the distress announcement dates. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein
(1994) define financial distress based on interest coverage ratios. A firm is classified as
financially distressed if in any two years after issuing junk bonds its EBITDA is less than its
reported interest expense, or if in any one year EBITDA is less than 80% of its interest expense.
They argue that selecting distressed firms using stock market information, as used in Gilson,
John and Lang (1990), may be misleading because stock market performance measures may
include some information about the ability of a firm to cope with financial distress. If the market
perceives that a particular company will be able to costlessly resolve its financial distress, the
market will not be severely negative on the stock valuation, and the sample will be biased to
firms with relatively costly financial distress. Although we fundamentally agree with the
14

arguments of Asquith et al. (1994), when the approach using interest expenses is tried in our
sample, we identify a very small number of firm-years as distress years. Therefore, to obtain a
larger sample, we select a less conservative approach considering the two years before filing for
Chapter 11, years –2 and –1, as a good approximation of the distress years when the relevant
negotiations and bargaining happen. We also calculate Ohlson (1980) O-scores and Altman
(1968) Z-scores to verify that the two years before filing may be characterized as distress years.
Our final sample consists of 163 supplier-customer pairs and 1,664 pair-year observations in the
time window of interest, with 10.2 yearly observations per pair on average

3.1.2. Summary statistics
The time window of interest of a pair primarily includes all the years in which there is a
reported relationship inside the limit of minus 10 and plus 10 years relative to the Chapter 11
filing date. Because we are interested in investigating suppliers’ leverage changes before and
after customers’ bankruptcy filing, we include supplier data up to five years after Chapter 11
filing in the sample, even if the reported relationship ends before year +5. Suppliers with sales
less than $10 million in 1990 dollars were dropped and observations with book leverage ratio
greater than 1 were right-censored at 1.10 All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels to lessen the effects of outliers. In the sample there are 156 unique suppliers distributed in
86 industries as defined by their four-digit SIC codes.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the suppliers and customer firms. We define
Book Leverage as the book value of total debt (debt in current liabilities [dlc] + long-term debt
[dltt]) divided by the book value of total assets (at). Market Leverage is defined as the book
value of total debt divided by the market value of assets (market value of equity [cshpri*prcc_f]
10

Alternatively, trimming observations in which supplier book leverage is greater than 1, instead of right-censoring,
does not qualitatively change the results.
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+ total debt + preferred stocks liquidation value [pstkl] – deferred taxes and investment credit
[txditc]). Short-Term Leverage is short-term debt (dlc) divided by book value of assets (at).
Long-Term Leverage is long-term debt (dltt) divided by book value of assets (at). Size is
computed as ln(sales). Market-to-Book ratio is defined as the ratio of market value of assets to
the book value of total assets. Profitability is the operating income before depreciation (oibdp)
divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant and equipment (ppent) divided by total
assets. R&D Intensity is total R&D expenditures (xrd) divided by total assets. This variable is
replaced with zero when R&D expenditures are not reported. Industry Median Leverage is the
median book leverage of the other firms in the same four-digit SIC industry classification.
Accounts Receivable Ratio is accounts receivable (rect) divided by sales.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the suppliers, and Panel B reports
the statistics for the customers.11 Customer firms are much larger than supplier firms; the larger
size of customers potentially increases suppliers’ vulnerability to pressure during contract
renegotiations. As expected, mean and median market leverage ratios of customers are
significantly higher, more than twice the magnitude of the suppliers’ market leverage. This is due
to customer stock prices being severely affected during the distress years. Considering the
spillover effects to suppliers’ stock prices (Hertzel et al. (2008)), we conservatively rely on
measures of supplier book leverage instead of supplier market leverage for our analyses. Market
leverage is calculated using stock prices, and a decrease in supplier stock prices will increase the
value of its market leverage, even if there is no actual change caused by issuance or retirement of
debt or equity. Panel C reports characteristics of the total sample and the sub-samples with only
the firms that reemerged (129 supplier-customer pairs) and only the firms that were liquidated
(34 supplier-customer pairs).
11
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We verify that the customers can be considered to be in financial distress in the two years
before filing for Chapter 11 by calculating the Ohlson (1980) scores (O-scores) and Altman
(1968) Z-scores. The average O-score for customers in the sample is –0.58 over all firm-years.
However, the average customer O-score increases from –0.81 in year –3 before filing, to –0.19 in
year –2, to 2.04 in year –1, indicating an increase in financial distress. The average O-score
drops to 0.31 in the filing year potentially reflecting the impact of some firms reorganizing
quickly in Chapter 11; a positive average O-score is nonetheless indicative of financial distress.
Similar qualitative results are obtained with Z-scores.

3.2. Benchmark sample
We also develop a sample of benchmark supplier-customer pairs for comparison to
control for changes in unobserved market and industry factors that might have affected firms’
capital structure. We follow a similar matching procedure as used above for filing firms;
however, in this instance, we match the customer data set with all Compustat companies and
then eliminate all treatment supplier and customer firms, as well as suppliers that are financial,
public, and utilities. Further, we restrict the benchmark sample to satisfy the following
requirements: pairs in the same industries as treatment pairs; customers and suppliers did not file
for Chapter 11; pairs reporting supplier-customer relationships in the same distress years as the
treatment pairs; and pairs with Compustat data available in the same years as the treatment pairs.
Following the multiple criteria above, and using four-, three-, and two-digit SIC industries in this
order of priority, we manually identify a unique benchmark supplier-customer pair for 72% of
the treatment supplier-customer pairs.
Our benchmark sample consists of 93 supplier-customer pairs that matched pairs with
reemerged customers in the treatment sample and 786 firm-year observations. It is not possible
17

to find benchmark pairs for 36 of the treatment pairs with reemerged customers, primarily due to
the non-coincidence of the relationship reporting years. Again, all ratio variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% levels to lessen the effects of outliers. In this benchmark sample there are 86
unique suppliers distributed in 45 industries defined by their four-digit SIC codes. Panel A of
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the benchmark suppliers, Panel B reports summary
statistics for the benchmark customers, and Panel C reports characteristics of the benchmark
sample. As expected, in this sample, mean and median market leverage customers' ratios are not
substantially higher than suppliers’ ratios because customers did not file for bankruptcy
protection and, on average, are not in distress.

4. Results and discussion
4.1. Supplier leverage around customer Chapter 11 filing
We examine the financial leverage of suppliers whose customers reorganized and
reemerged after Chapter 11.12 If a supplier believes that its customer will liquidate, there is no
point in adjusting capital structure in order to change its bargaining power. Implicitly, we
propose that a supplier is informed about its customer and can form a reasonable opinion about a
customer’s viability and the likelihood that the customer can reorganize and survive the
bankruptcy.13 This is because when a supplier’s livelihood depends on a major customer, the
supplier constantly assesses the customer’s assets and capabilities in order to reduce the costs of
under-diversification. There is a constant flow of information between suppliers and customers
through formal (order processing) and informal (meetings, phone and online conversations, and
site visits) channels through which suppliers and customers can gain insider-like information

12

In subsequent analysis, we separately investigate the financial leverage of suppliers whose customers were
liquidated after filing for Chapter 11.
13
We relax this assumption later by using an empirical model to predict customer reorganization or liquidation.
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about each other. Consequently, a supplier can develop an informed evaluation of the possibility
of recovery of the customer.
Table 3 reports the univariate analysis for supplier book leverage. Panel A presents the
mean and median industry-adjusted supplier book leverages from year –4 to year +4 for suppliers
with reemerged customers.14 The timing of suppliers adopting higher leverage for bargaining
purposes depends upon when they anticipate facing bargaining pressure from customers while
negotiating long-term supplier contracts. It can be argued that the customer may exert more
bargaining power when they first encounter financial difficulties. Closer to the bankruptcy filing,
they may be in a much weaker bargaining position and may need the help of suppliers for
survival.
There is a substantial increase in supplier book leverage in year –2. The mean industryadjusted book leverage is significantly greater than zero at the 1% level in year –2 and
marginally significant in year –1, but insignificant for all other years. Panel B presents the mean
and median industry-adjusted supplier book leverages from year –4 to year +4 for suppliers with
liquidated customers. In this panel, both the mean and median book leverages exhibit a trend
with a small decrease until year –1; however, the deviations from the median industry leverage
are not statistically significant in any year. Although the results in Panel A are not compelling,
the univariate test results do seem to suggest that suppliers increase their leverage in the years
before the customer files for Chapter 11 if they assess that the customer will be able to reemerge
after Chapter 11 and, therefore, will have a continuing business relationship.
Next, we conduct a multivariate analysis of the changes in supplier capital structure
employing standard control variables. Equation (1) presents the model for the multivariable
regressions with supplier’s book leverage as the dependent variable.
14

Industry-adjusted book leverage is calculated by subtracting the industry median book leverage from the firm
book leverage.
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8

𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗=4

+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(1)

To ensure that our results are not driven by our choice in designating the period of
customer distress, we explore two specifications. In our first specification (Model 1),
BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the two years before the customer’s Chapter
11 filing, years –2 and –1, and zero otherwise. The Transition dummy variable is set to 1 in the
year of and the two years after the Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. In our second
specification (Model 2), we split the BeforeFiling dummy in two separate dummies, one for year
–2 and the other for year –1. BeforeFiling[–2] receives the value of one in the year –2, and zero
otherwise. BeforeFiling[–1] receives the value of one in the year before the filing for Chapter 11,
year –1, and zero otherwise; Transition is set to one in the year of and the two years after the
Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. In both models, the AfterFiling dummy variable is set to 1
in year +3 and all the subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Xi,t-1 are the controls for supplier’s
book leverage, ui controls for firm fixed effects, μt controls for year fixed effects, and εi,t is a
random error term.
Table 4 reports the results of the pooled OLS regressions using the model of Eq. (1) for
all dummy variables’ specifications.15 The coefficients of the BeforeFiling dummies are positive
and statistically significant. The positive relationships are also economically significant. In
column 1, our first specification for the dummies, the coefficient implies that suppliers increase
their leverage by 5.5% on average in the two years before the distressed customer files for
Chapter 11. The coefficient of the Transition dummy is positive and statistically significant at

15

Because the number of suppliers (125) is almost the same as the number of pairs (129) in our treatment sample,
use of pair-year fixed effects present similar results as supplier-year fixed effects. Additionally, when errors are
clustered by customers, a natural grouping with this sample because several customers are reported by multiple
suppliers, the results are similar.
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the 5% level, indicating that suppliers keep a higher leverage in these years. When dummy
variables are used to analyze supplier leverage in years –2 and –1 separately as shown in Model
2, the coefficients are both positive and statistically significant, indicating that suppliers maintain
a higher leverage in year –1, after increasing it in year –2.
The coefficients of the AfterFiling dummy are also positive but not statistically different
from zero. Thus, the leverage levels before and after the distress and transition years are not
significantly different. This evidence indicates that although supplier leverage increases prior to
a significant customer’s bankruptcy filing, it eventually returns to previous levels.16 Given the
protection during the Chapter 11 process and the expected financial restructuring of liabilities
during reorganization, customers are no longer vulnerable to financial distress. Thus, the need for
leverage-induced enhancement of supplier bargaining power is diminished, if not eliminated.
Consequently, suppliers return to leverage levels deemed to be optimal under normal conditions.
The effect and signs of the control variables in Table 4 are consistent with the literature
(e.g., Leary and Roberts 2014), and most of these coefficients are statistically significant. The
high R2s found in the specifications are consistent with short data panels where firm dummies
capture a large portion of the cross-sectional variation (Flannery and Hankins 2013). In addition
to controlling for unobservable firm and year effects, there may be common local unobservable
economic shocks that may affect customer and supplier simultaneously. To address this concern,
we add state fixed effects to these models in Table 4 and we find that the results are qualitatively
unchanged and quantitatively very similar.17
In this analysis, we have considered all suppliers whose customers reorganized
successfully. However, suppliers may initiate leverage adjustments only if they expect the

16

Note that the coefficients for the BeforeFiling, Transition and AfterFiling dummy variables measure deviations
from supplier leverage maintained during the years prior to customer financial distress.
17
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional test. We do not tabulate these additional results in
the interest of brevity.
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reorganized customer to continue to be a significant customer. Based on the reported suppliercustomer relationship after the distress years, we eliminated observations where the distressed
customer is no longer reported as a significant customer after the customer’s bankruptcy filing.
When we estimate the models of Table 4 for this smaller sample, we obtain similar results. For
instance, the coefficient for the BeforeFiling dummy is 0.039 compared to 0.055 reported in
Model 1 of Table 4, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the
AfterFiling dummy remains statistically insignificant. In the interest of brevity, these results are
not tabulated.
In sum, the results indicate that the suppliers of distressed customers modify their relative
negotiating position by increasing leverage during the years before customers file for
bankruptcy, supporting the bargaining theory hypothesis put forward by Bronars and Deere
(1991). The evidence also indicates that these suppliers return to their previous leverage levels a
few years after the customers file for Chapter 11.

4.2. Analysis of the alternative hypothesis based on trade credit extension
Another possible explanation for the increase in supplier leverage before a customer files
for Chapter 11 is that suppliers may be inclined to offer trade credit and act as liquidity providers
to their important costumers in distress. For example, Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2009)
develop a model and investigate the trade-off between inventories and trade credit. Their
argument is that the supplier may extend trade credit to financially constrained customers in
order to obtain credit-financed sales, instead of accumulating costly inventories of finished goods
that may or may not be sold in the future. Although these authors do not specifically look at
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customers that are in distress, their arguments for a trade credit extension hypothesis are relevant
in our setting and deserve to be investigated.18
If suppliers increase their debt in order to extend trade credit to distressed customers who
face constraints in accessing capital, we expect that suppliers preferentially contract short-term
debt to match the maturity of the short-term credit they extend to their distressed customers. We
examine the validity of this maturity matching argument in Table 5, by assessing the relationship
of accounts receivable to short-term and long-term leverage. We rely on Dass, Kale and Nanda
(2015), and Molina and Preve (2009) to select our control variables. The accounts receivable-tosales ratio is the dependent variable in all three models in Table 5 but they differ in the debt ratio
used as an explanatory variable. Evidence reported in Table 5 confirms that trade credit is
positively related to the total debt ratio lending credence to the argument that the increase in total
debt ratio prior to customer distress observed in Table 4 may be driven by additional trade credit
extended by suppliers to distressed customers. Examining Models 2 and 3, we find that,
consistent with the maturity matching hypothesis, trade credit is positively related to the shortterm debt ratio but it is unrelated to the long-term debt ratio in our sample. Results in Table 5
suggest that while the trade credit mechanism may lead to increases in short-term debt ratios, it is
unlikely to explain changes in the long-term debt ratios.
Following the bargaining power theory mechanism, suppliers are interested in arguing
during negotiations that they do not have flexibility to offer better prices and trade conditions to
their distressed customers because they need to meet their own debt obligations. In this
framework, we expect that suppliers prefer to contract long-term debt instead of short-term debt
in order to provide more credibility to their argument. Based on these observations, we examine
the behavior of short-term and long-term debt ratios prior to customer distress. Table 6 presents

18

We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative mechanism.
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the result of the analysis of supplier book leverages using short-term (Model 1) and long-term
(Model 2) book debt, normalized by total book assets, as dependent variables. The BeforeFiling
dummy is set to 1 in years –2 and –1, following Model 1 of Table 4. The coefficients are positive
and statistically significant for both definitions of the dependent variable; however, the results
show that most of the increase in the leverage ratio is due to the increase in long-term debt (4.9%
vs 1.8%), supporting primarily the bargaining power hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is possible that
both mechanisms — trade credit and bargaining power — may be at work in our setting,
especially in the case of short-term debt. Thus, we analyze the dynamic characteristics of the
trade credit in the time window of interest, that is, the years just before the customer applies for
Chapter 11.
Model 1 of Table 7 presents the results of the analysis of supplier trade credit in the two
years before the customer files for Chapter 11.19 We use the same time dummies BeforeFiling,
Transition, and AfterFiling as defined in Model 1 of Table 4 to study the behavior of trade credit
when a significant customer experiences financial distress. We do not include any leverage
measure as an explanatory variable, since their inclusion may mask the increase in accounts
receivable, if debt is used to finance such increases. The results show that the coefficient for the
BeforeFiling time dummy variable is positive but not significantly different from zero at the
usual significance levels. Therefore, in our sample, suppliers of important distressed customers
do not extend more trade credit, on average, during periods of customer distress. This evidence
does not support the trade credit mechanism explanation for the increase in supplier book
leverage during periods of financial distress of significant customers.

In addition, we develop a univariate analysis tabulating the changes in suppliers’ Accounts Receivable/Sales and
Accounts Payable/Costs of Good Sold, adjusted by either benchmark firm ratios or industry median ratios, from
years –4 to +2. The results present no evidence of increase in these supplier ratios before the customer files for
Chapter 11.
19
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Next, we use a two-stage model to conduct a more detailed examination of whether trade
credit can explain the increases in supplier financial leverage during periods of customer
financial distress. In the first stage, we estimate the level of abnormal accounts receivable, and in
the second stage we add this measure of abnormal accounts receivable as an explanatory variable
in our leverage analysis to check whether it can account for the increase in supplier leverage
during periods of customer financial distress. Model 2 of Table 7 is used to estimate the normal
level of accounts receivable given the determinants of trade credit; the residuals from this model
are used as the measure of abnormal accounts receivable.
In the second stage analysis, we use the abnormal accounts receivable as an additional
control in our primary model of Leverage (Eq. (1)). These estimates are presented in Table 8.
Model 1 of Table 8 uses the total debt ratio as the dependent variable, previously defined as total
book debt to total book assets. Models 2 and 3 are the decomposition in which the dependent
variables are the short-term and long-term debt ratios. We observe that total leverage is
positively related to the abnormal accounts receivable (Model 1). Thus, it appears that firms
increase leverage to provide additional trade credit. However, the coefficient for the BeforeFiling
dummy continues to be statistically significant even after controlling for the impact of trade
credit on leverage. Thus, the previously documented significant increase in leverage during
customer distress cannot be attributed to changes in trade credit.
Next, we examine the results separately for short-term and long-term debt ratios of
suppliers in Models 2 and 3 of Table 8. Not surprisingly, only the short-term debt ratio has a
significant, positive relation to the use of trade credit. This positive relation is consistent with
trade credit partially explaining the changes in short-term debt. Nonetheless, the coefficient for
the BeforeFiling dummy is still positive and statistically significant even after controlling for the
potential impact of changes in trade credit; comparing it with the corresponding coefficient value
25

reported in Table 6, there is no diminution in the increase in the short-term debt ratio during the
period before a significant customer’s bankruptcy filing. Model 3 shows that the long-term debt
ratio is unaffected by the level of abnormal accounts receivable and it has a positive coefficient
for the BeforeFiling dummy, which is highly statistically significant. Thus, the trade credit-based
explanation cannot fully account for the observed changes in supplier leverage during periods of
customer distress. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the bargaining power hypothesis
explanation of supplier leverage changes.

4.3. Benchmark sample tests
Next, we present evidence on whether changes in supplier leverage are driven by the
dynamics in the supplier industry rather than customer financial distress. Table 9 presents the
result of the analysis of supplier book leverage in the sample of benchmark suppliers in the same
industry as suppliers in our treatment sample but whose customers do not file for bankruptcy.
The BeforeFiling dummy variable is defined relative to the Chapter 11 filing date of the
treatment customers in order to verify if the increase of leverage is specific to the treatment
suppliers or if it is systematic to their industries. The coefficients of BeforeFiling dummies are
positive, but not statistically significant at the usual levels. We also test several different
definitions for the years of the dummy variables during the time window of interest, before and
after the Chapter 11 filing (e.g., using three or four years before filing), during the reorganization
time window, and after reemerging—with similar nonsignificant results. In sum, the benchmark
sample is used as a control group in the same years we see the effects in the treatment sample,
and we are not able to identify any effect on the benchmark suppliers’ leverage.20 Therefore, the

20

Another commonly used technique for benchmark comparisons is Propensity Score Matching. The difficulty in
our framework is to find one or more relevant conditioning variables, based on finance theory and empirical
evidence, that affect both the propensity of customers in that participate in the event (customer files for Chapter 11)
and the performance of suppliers (supplier increases leverage).
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observed changes in supplier leverage in our sample cannot be attributed to industry-wide
effects. Rather, it is unique to suppliers whose customers experience financial distress.

4.4. Additional implications of the bargaining power hypothesis
We examine two settings where suppliers have less motivation to adjust capital structure
for bargaining power considerations. First, we investigate if supplier industry concentration,
which may also proxy for bargaining power, has any effect on the results. Second, we investigate
suppliers that do not have a continuing reported relationship with their distressed customers. The
absence of a reported relationship after the distress years may be either due to the liquidation of
the customers or due to the fact that sales to them are greatly diminished and they are no longer
significant customers. In such cases, we do not expect suppliers to adjust their capital structure,
because maintaining bargaining power with respect to such customers has no value.

4.4.1. Analysis of effects of supplier industry concentration
We are interested in gauging the effect of customer distress and bankruptcy on suppliers’
leverage in concentrated industries. Suppliers in highly concentrated industries do not need to
fortify their bargaining power, or at least not as much as suppliers in less concentrated industries,
because they already have enough power for negotiations with customers. Thus, we expect that
suppliers in high concentration industries do not increase their leverage as much as suppliers in
low concentration industries. We measure industry concentration by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, which is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of the firms that operate in a
business segment of the industry, defined by its four-digit SIC.
We report in Table 10 the results of the analysis of the impact of supplier concentration.
We create a new dummy, called HighSuppHefIndex, that receives the value of 1 if the supplier
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industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index is in the top 25% of Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for our
sample in the two years before customer filing, and zero otherwise. We include three new factors
in the regressions, the interactions between our previous dummies and the new dummy
HighSuppHefIndex, in order to segregate the effect for the suppliers in high-concentration
industries. All the coefficients of these new independent variables are negative and, specifically
for the interaction with the BeforeFiling dummy, it is statistically significant at the 10% level. A
combined coefficient for BeforeFiling and for high industry-concentration suppliers indicates an
increase in leverage of only 2.1%, instead of 5.5% for the total treatment sample. This result
shows that a higher supplier industry concentration is associated with a substantially smaller
increase in suppliers’ leverage in the distress years, consistent with the bargaining power
hypothesis.

4.4.2. Analysis of leverage changes for suppliers with distressed customers that are liquidated or
become unimportant
Suppliers have no incentives to adjust leverage for bargaining power reasons if they do
not expect that they will continue to have a significant relationship with a distressed customer in
the future. Therefore, we investigate suppliers that do not present a continuing reported
relationship with their distressed customers. The absence of a reported relationship after the
distress years may be either due to the liquidation of the customers or due to the fact that sales to
them are greatly diminished and they are no longer significant customers. In both cases, we do
not expect suppliers to adjust their capital structure, because maintaining bargaining power with
respect to such customers has no value.
First, we analyze leverage changes of suppliers whose distressed customers are liquidated
during the Chapter 11 process. Table 11 reports these results in Column 1. The empirical
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evidence indicates that suppliers do not increase their leverage before the customer files for
Chapter 11 if the customer liquidates after the distress years. The coefficient of the BeforeFiling
dummy is negative and not statistically significant. This result supports our assumption that
suppliers increase their leverage only if they expect that the distressed customer will reemerge
from Chapter 11.
Second, from the sample of suppliers with customers that reorganized and reemerged
from bankruptcy, we create a subsample of suppliers that end the relationship after the customer
files for Chapter 11. The last report of a significant relationship with the distressed customer
occurs before the bankruptcy filing. Thus, in these cases, suppliers in our sample either
completely terminated their business relationship with the distressed customer or the relationship
is no longer important, with sales representing less than 10% of total sales. We verify that these
suppliers continue to report a relationship with at least one other customer after the distressed
customer files for bankruptcy. Therefore, the lack of a reported relationship with the distressed
customer is not due to the supplier changing its policy on naming significant customers.
If the bargaining power theory describes supplier’s behavior in this setting, we predict
that suppliers do not change capital structure in such situations, because they anticipate that their
relationship with the distressed customer will not be important anymore. We supplement the
sample considered in Column 1 of Table 11 with the sample of suppliers with reemerged
customers that are no longer important and estimate Eq. (1) for this combined sample of
suppliers. The results are reported in Column 2 of Table 11. As expected, the results for this
sample confirm that suppliers do not increase leverage before the customer’s bankruptcy filing,
when the relationship with the customer is either terminated or no longer significant.21

21

One potential explanation for results in Table 4 is that there is a mechanical increase in supplier book leverage
because the distress of a significant customer depresses the book value of supplier equity, perhaps due to lower
profit margins. Results in Table 11 refute this possibility because we do not observe an increase in supplier book
leverage prior to customer bankruptcy filing in these samples.
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4.5. Ex-ante assessment of customers that are likely to reorganize versus liquidate
We argue that a supplier will use leverage as a bargaining tool in negotiations only if it
believes that its customer has substantial chances of recovery from distress. In Section 4.1, we
investigate the sample of suppliers whose customers reemerged after Chapter 11 and we find that
suppliers increase their leverage before the filing. Such an analysis assumes that suppliers can
identify the customers that will successfully reemerge from Chapter 11.
To relax this assumption of perfect foresight regarding the customer reorganization or
liquidation decision, we rely on the forecast of the probability of customer reorganization using
the coefficients from a binomial logistic regression (Model 2) presented in Kolay et al. (2015).22
Table 12 reports the results. Panel A presents the summary statistics for calculated probabilities
of reorganization for customers that reemerged and for customers that liquidated. The mean
probability of reorganization for the group of reemerged customers is 0.607 and the
corresponding mean for the liquidated customers is 0.445. The difference between the means of
probabilities of reorganization between the two groups is significant at the 1% level. In Panel B
(confusion matrix), we verify that this model can successfully predict reorganization for 79% of
the customers that actually reorganized; similarly, it predicts liquidation for 65% of the
customers that actually liquidated.23
Using the predictions of this model, we conduct the analysis on a sample of suppliers
whose customers are predicted to reemerge after reorganization. Table 13 presents the results,
which are qualitatively similar to the original treatment sample comprising suppliers to
customers that did in fact reorganize. Suppliers increase leverage by 4.4% in the years before

22

This model is similar to Model 3 in Lemmon, Ma and Tashjian (2009).
We classify customer firms as predicted to be reorganized (liquidated), if the probability of reorganization is
greater (less) than 0.5.
23
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customers file for Chapter 11 and return to previous levels after the bankruptcy filing. 24 We also
analyze leverage changes of suppliers whose customers are predicted by the model to liquidate,
and the unreported results for this subsample indicate that suppliers do not increase their leverage
before the customer files for Chapter 11.
The model from Kolay et al. (2015) relies on public accounting information, which
implies that its prediction is a more conservative estimate of the predictive capability of
suppliers. Nevertheless, the results still support our conclusion that suppliers increase their
leverage when a significant customer enters financial distress if they believe that the customer
will likely reemerge from Chapter 11.

5. Conclusion
A distressed, large customer might put pressure on its under-diversified suppliers — for
instance, to provide a larger discount or to accept late payments — especially if the customer
believes that the suppliers have resource slack. Predicting this behavior, a supplier might take
measures to increase its bargaining power as the customer prepares to formally file for
bankruptcy. This paper investigates how economic or financial distress of a major customer can
impact the strategic choices of capital structure of a supplier.
Looking at customer firms that reemerged from bankruptcy after reorganizing, we find
that their suppliers increase their leverage in the years before the filing date. This change is
economically significant and consistent with the bargaining theory hypothesis proposed by
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We also estimate the probability of customer reorganization using a modified model from the original in Kolay et
al. (2015). Their model employs variables such as industry-adjusted operating performance (EBITDA-to-assets) and
R&D-to-assets ratio using the average of values in years –3 and –2, as well as industry distress and low GDP year
dummies assessed in years 0 or –1. In our modified model, we omit variables that are assessed in years 0 and –1.
Our intention is to test a prediction model which can be used to evaluate the probability of reorganization two years
before the customer files for Chapter 11. Not surprisingly, this modified model is less accurate as it increases our
number of predicted reorganized customers by six, but only two of these customers actually reorganized.
Nevertheless, regression results are qualitatively similar for both models.
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Bronars and Deere (1991), which states that an increase in debt decreases the surplus available
for negotiations with nonfinancial stakeholders, thus increasing the firm’s bargaining power. In
our setting, the supplier firm increases its debt when the bargaining power of its counterparty
increases. The main concern for the supplier is to keep its strategic negotiation position as strong
as possible if it believes that its customer has substantial chances of recovery. Suppliers’
bargaining power is especially relevant because distressed customers may be pressing their
suppliers to give better trade conditions, such as reducing prices or extending credit. We also
find that suppliers do not increase leverage in the years before customers’ Chapter 11 filing when
customers are liquidated or if suppliers cease to report the distressed firm as a significant
customer. If the supplier believes the customer will liquidate or become insignificant in terms of
relative sales, there is no need for the supplier to fortify its bargaining power. Furthermore, we
show that the use of debt to enhance bargaining power is lower for suppliers that are in highconcentrated industries, compared to suppliers in less concentrated industries.
We also investigate another possible explanation for the increase in supplier leverage: the
trade credit mechanism. Suppliers may be inclined to offer trade credit and act as liquidity
providers to their important customers in distress. We find no evidence that suppliers increase
their accounts receivable before their distressed customer files for Chapter 11. Moreover, most of
the increase in supplier leverage is due to an increase in long-term debt rather than short-term
debt, which also does not support a trade credit mechanism argument.
Additionally, we hypothesize and investigate if this strategic negotiation move is
temporary, with the supplier returning to a previous relative status quo, probably inside a target
range for leverage, after the distressed customer reorganizes and reemerges from Chapter 11. We
find evidence that suppliers do indeed reduce their leverage after the customer reemerges from
Chapter 11, indicating a return to a previous status quo of bargaining power.
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Table 1
Summary statistics—treatment sample.
This table reports summary statistics for our sample during the period 1980–2013. The sample
consists of suppliers whose significant customers filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Panel A
reports summary statistics for suppliers, Panel B reports summary statistics for customers that
filed for bankruptcy, and Panel C reports the sample and sub-sample characteristics. Book
Leverage is total debt divided by total book value of assets. Short-Term Leverage is short-term
debt divided by total book value of assets. Long-Term Leverage is long-term debt divided by
total book value of assets. Market Leverage is total debt divided by total market value of assets.
Firm Size is the log of sales. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total
assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of
total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. Accounts
Receivable Ratio is accounts receivable divided by sales. All ratios were winsorized at 1% and
99%.
Panel A. Supplier summary statistics
N

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Book Leverage
Short-Term Leverage
Long-Term Leverage
Market Leverage
Size
Tangibility
Profitability
Market-to-Book
R&D Intensity
Accounts Receivable Ratio

0.25
0.06
0.19
0.31
5.58
0.27
0.09
1.26
0.03
0.18

0.21
0.02
0.13
0.23
5.39
0.22
0.11
0.90
0
0.15

0.23
0.10
0.22
0.29
1.89
0.21
0.15
1.38
0.07
0.15

0
0
0
0
2.30
0
-1.20
0.03
0
0.02

1.00
0.56
1.00
1.07
10.46
0.93
0.64
23.45
0.82
0.35

Panel B. Customer summary statistics
N

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Book Leverage
Market Leverage
Size
Tangibility
Profitability
Market-to-Book
R&D Intensity

0.43
0.62
10.31
0.37
0.10
0.93
0.04

0.31
0.68
10.50
0.33
0.10
0.65
0

0.37
0.34
1.86
0.20
0.09
0.80
0.06

0
0
2.35
0
-1.06
0.0001
0

1.82
3.06
12.24
0.82
0.36
6.56
0.38

1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664

1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
1,664
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel C. Sample characteristics
Total
Sample
No. of Observations (Firm-years)
No. of Supplier-Customer Pairs
No. of Suppliers
No. of Customers

1,664
163
156
62
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Sample
with
Reemerged
Customers
Only
1,402
129
125
36

Sample
with
Liquidated
Customers
Only
262
34
33
26

Table 2
Summary statistics — benchmark sample.
This table reports summary statistics for our benchmark sample during the period 1980-2013.
The sample has all supplier-customer pairs in the same industries as the treatment firms, where
the supplier-customer relationship was reported in the same time window as the treatment pairs,
but the customers did not file for bankruptcy. Panel A reports summary statistics for the suppliers
and Panel B for the customers. Panel C reports the sample characteristics. Book Leverage is total
debt divided by total book value of assets. Short-Term Leverage is short-term debt divided by
total book value of assets. Long-Term Leverage is long-term debt divided by total book value of
assets. Market Leverage is total debt divided by total market value of assets. Firm Size is the log
of sales. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Profitability is
EBITDA divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book
assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. All ratios were winsorized at 1%
and 99%.
Panel A. Supplier summary statistics
N

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Book Leverage
Short-Term Leverage
Long-Term Leverage
Market Leverage
Size
Tangibility
Profitability
Market-to-Book
R&D Intensity

0.22
0.06
0.16
0.25
5.32
0.27
0.10
1.34
0.04

0.19
0.01
0.09
0.17
5.03
0.21
0.12
1.02
0.002

0.21
0.11
0.19
0.26
1.67
0.21
0.16
1.29
0.07

0
0
0
0
2.32
0.001
-1.57
0.18
0

1.00
0.58
0.81
1.01
9.88
0.93
0.42
14.15
0.59

Panel B. Customer summary statistics
N

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Book Leverage
Market Leverage
Size
Tangibility
Profitability
Market-to-Book
R&D Intensity

0.41
0.48
9.91
0.39
0.15
2.07
0.04

0.39
0.46
10.01
0.29
0.13
1.05
0.006

0.23
0.30
1.85
0.23
0.09
2.97
0.07

0
0
4.19
0.05
-0.21
0.28
0

1.16
1.10
13.05
0.92
0.42
20.11
0.37

786
786
786
786
786
786
786
786
786

786
786
786
786
786
786
786
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Table 2 (continued)
Panel C. Sample characteristics
Benchmark
Sample
No. of Observations (Firm-years)
No. of Supplier-Customer Pairs
No. of Suppliers
No. of Customers

786
93
86
60
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Table 3
Univariate analysis of industry-adjusted suppliers book leverage.
This table reports univariate analysis of industry-adjusted book leverage for suppliers whose
significant customers filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Panel A reports the leverage for
suppliers whose customers reemerged from bankruptcy, and Panel B reports the leverage for
suppliers whose customers liquidated. Book Leverage is total debt divided by total book value of
assets, adjusted by subtracting the industry median value. The p-values (reported in parentheses)
are calculated from t-tests for the means and from Wilcoxon rank sum tests for the medians. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Industry-adjusted book leverage for suppliers with reemerged customers

Mean

Median

-4

-3

-2

0.03

0.04

0.08***

(0.30)

(0.12)

0.00
(0.69)

Year
-1

0

1

2

3

4

0.05*

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.00

0.02

(0.009)

(0.08)

(0.65)

(0.49)

(0.81)

(0.99)

(0.45)

0.02

0.03*

0.00

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

-0.04

-0.02

(0.40)

(0.07)

(0.29)

(0.33)

(0.66)

(0.35)

(0.50)

(0.95)

Panel B. Industry-adjusted book leverage for suppliers with liquidated customers

Mean

Median

-4

-3

Year
-2

0.00

-0.01

-0.03

-0.03

0.02

0.01

0.05

0.00

0.03

(0.91)

(0.87)

(0.41)

(0.40)

(0.67)

(0.84)

(0.22)

(0.99)

(0.42)

-0.05

-0.03

-0.01

-0.02

0.03

-0.01

0.02

-0.02

-0.01

(0.86)

(0.65)

(0.44)

(0.36)

(0.64)

(0.92)

(0.35)

(0.79)

(0.55)

-1

0

1

2

3

4
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Table 4
Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers to distressed customers that survived.
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage before and after customer bankruptcy filing
using lagged supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after
bankruptcy. In Model (1), BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1
relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable
that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero
otherwise. In Model (2), BeforeFiling[–2] dummy is set to 1 in year –2 and zero otherwise, and
BeforeFiling[–1] dummy is set to 1 in year –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and
zero otherwise; the Transition dummy is set to 1 in years 0, 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. In all
models, AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and
zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets.
Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the
market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total
assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.
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(1)
BeforeFiling

0.0547***
(3.232)

BeforeFiling[-2]

0.0364**
(2.149)
0.0144
(0.708)

0.0497**
(2.484)
0.0604***
(2.819)
0.0373**
(2.197)
0.0152
(0.747)

0.0408***
(4.442)
-0.0167***
(-3.994)

0.0409***
(4.436)
-0.0168***
(-4.083)

-0.209***
(-3.279)
0.0560
(0.856)

-0.210***
(-3.283)
0.0573
(0.872)

-0.189*
(-1.692)
0.127**
(2.130)

-0.189*
(-1.691)
0.126**
(2.106)

1,350
0.781
Yes
Yes

1,350
0.781
Yes
Yes

BeforeFiling[-1]
Transition
AfterFiling
Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1
Industry Median Leveraget-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

(2)

42

Table 5
Analysis of accounts receivable changes of suppliers to distressed customers that survived.
This table reports analysis of supplier accounts receivable before and after customer bankruptcy
filing using supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after
bankruptcy. In models 1 thru 3, the dependent variable (logarithm of the firm’s accounts
receivable to sales ratio) and the controls are the same as Table II of Dass, Kale and Nanda
(2015), supplemented by three additional control factors used by Molina and Preve (2009):
accounts payable ratio, inventory ratio and sales growth. Relationship-specific investment
measure (RSI) is R&D expense divided by lagged total assets. Operating profits is EBITDA
divided by sales. Firm Size is the log of sales. Leverage measures are total book leverage (Model
1), short-term book leverage (Model 2) or long-term book leverage (Model 3). Cash holdings
ratio is cash held by the firm divided by its lagged total book assets. Market-to-Book is the
market value of total assets to total book assets. Profitability is income before extraordinary
items divided by lagged total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by
total assets. Kaplan-Zingales Index is constructed as per Dass, Kale and Nanda (2015). It is equal
to: 3.139x(Book Leverage) + 0.283x(Tobin’s Q) – 1.002x (Cashflow/Lagged Assets) –
39.368x(Dividends) – 1.315x(Cash Holdings). Accounts payable ratio is accounts payable to cost
of goods sold. Inventory ratio is inventory to cost of goods sold. Sales growth is the percent
difference in sales from the previous year. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on
p-values.
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RSI (R&D-to-Assetst-1)
EBITDA-to-Sales
Size
Total Debt/Total Assets

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.0826
(0.110)
-0.0187
(-0.110)
-0.0645***
(-2.756)
0.237**
(2.392)

0.0583
(0.078)
-0.0158
(-0.0935)
-0.0525**
(-2.358)

0.119
(0.158)
-0.0190
(-0.112)
-0.0549**
(-2.379)

Short-Term Debt/Total Assets

0.325**
(2.292)

Long-Term Debt/Total Assets
Cash Holdings
Market-to-Book
Profitability
Tangibility
Kaplan-Zingales Index
Accounts Payable Ratio
Inventory Ratio
Sales Growth

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

-0.452***
(-3.671)
0.0032
(0.243)
0.256*
(1.743)
-0.435***
(-2.607)
-0.0387**
(-2.188)
0.475***
(4.329)
0.314**
(2.023)
0.0628*
(1.731)

-0.417***
(-3.371)
0.0005
(0.038)
0.244*
(1.682)
-0.423**
(-2.495)
-0.0229
(-1.632)
0.478***
(4.402)
0.312**
(2.001)
0.0644*
(1.784)

-0.0269
(-0.337)
-0.446***
(-3.622)
-0.0007
(-0.054)
0.224
(1.552)
-0.436**
(-2.570)
-0.0151
(-0.937)
0.484***
(4.409)
0.320**
(2.030)
0.0660*
(1.820)

1,250
0.844
Yes
Yes

1,250
0.844
Yes
Yes

1,250
0.843
Yes
Yes
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Table 6
Analysis of short-term and long-term leverage changes of suppliers to distressed customers that
survived.
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage before and after customer bankruptcy filing
using lagged supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after
bankruptcy. In Model (1), the dependent variable is short-term debt to total book assets. In
Model (2), the dependent variable is long-term debt to total book assets. BeforeFiling is a
dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing,
and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s
Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy
variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the
log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant,
and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total
book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. Heteroskedastic-robust tstatistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.

BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1
Industry Median Leveraget-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

(1)
STD/TA

(2)
LTD/TA

0.0184*
(1.678)
0.0243**
(2.225)
0.0105
(0.826)

0.0492**
(2.359)
0.0055
(0.266)
-0.0004
(-0.017)

-0.0011
(-0.202)
-0.0054**
(-2.436)

0.0378***
(2.955)
-0.0091*
(-1.750)

-0.0868**
(-2.473)
-0.0197
(-0.527)

-0.166**
(-2.501)
0.0944
(1.163)

-0.0394
(-0.629)
0.0044
(0.098)

-0.229*
(-1.820)
0.156**
(2.233)

1,350
0.443
Yes
Yes

1,350
0.720
Yes
Yes
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Table 7
Analysis of accounts receivable changes of suppliers to distressed customers that survived.
This table reports analysis of supplier accounts receivable before and after customer bankruptcy
filing using supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after
bankruptcy. In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable (logarithm of the firm’s accounts
receivable to sales ratio) and the controls are the same as Table II of Dass, Kale and Nanda
(2015), supplemented by three additional control factors used by Molina and Preve (2009) in
their model: accounts payable ratio, inventory ratio and sales growth. BeforeFiling is a dummy
variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero
otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11
filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is
set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Relationship-specific investment
measure (RSI) is R&D expense divided by lagged total assets. Operating profits is EBITDA
divided by sales. Firm Size is the log of sales. Cash holdings ratio is cash held by the firm
divided by its lagged total book assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total
book assets. Profitability is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets.
Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Kaplan-Zingales Index
is constructed as per Dass, Kale and Nanda (2015). It is equal to: 3.139x(Book Leverage) +
0.283x(Tobin’s Q) – 1.002x (Cashflow/Lagged Assets) – 39.368x(Dividends) – 1.315x(Cash
Holdings). Accounts payable ratio is accounts payable to cost of goods sold. Inventory ratio is
inventory to cost of goods sold. Sales growth is the percent difference in sales from the previous
year. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.
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BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
RSI (R&D-to-Assetst-1)
EBITDA-to-Sales
Size
Cash Holdings
Market-to-Book
Profitability
Tangibility
Kaplan-Zingales Index
Accounts Payable Ratio
Inventory Ratio
Sales Growth

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

(1)

(2)

0.0359
(0.821)
-0.0059
(-0.128)
-0.0111
(-0.198)
0.126
(0.166)
-0.0276
(-0.162)
-0.0559**
(-2.439)
-0.458***
(-3.691)
-0.0006
(-0.048)
0.234
(1.597)
-0.433**
(-2.517)
-0.0183
(-1.297)
0.483***
(4.280)
0.316**
(2.012)
0.0665*
(1.829)

0.123
(0.163)
-0.0217
(-0.128)
-0.0559**
(-2.492)
-0.449***
(-3.662)
-0.0005
(-0.043)
0.228
(1.564)
-0.436**
(-2.572)
-0.0172
(-1.212)
0.484***
(4.403)
0.320**
(2.031)
0.0659*
(1.815)

1,250
0.844
Yes
Yes

1,250
0.843
Yes
Yes
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Table 8
Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers controlling for abnormal changes in trade credit.
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage before and after customer bankruptcy filing
using lagged supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after
bankruptcy. In Model (1), the dependent variable is total book leverage. In Model (2), the
dependent variable is short-term debt to total book assets. In Model (3), the dependent variable is
long-term debt to total book assets. BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2
and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy
variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2,
and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent
years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total
assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book
is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by
total assets. Abnormal A/R is the residual from the regression in Model 2 of Table 7.
Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.
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(1)
Total Debt/TA

(2)
STD/TA

(3)
LTD/TA

0.0687***
(3.813)
0.0471***
(2.604)
0.0319
(1.490)
0.0413***
(3.552)

0.0199*
(1.706)
0.0293***
(2.635)
0.0136
(1.053)
-0.00562
(-0.962)

0.0643***
(3.073)
0.0117
(0.559)
0.0143
(0.576)
0.0452***
(3.179)

-0.0163***
(-3.446)
-0.201**
(-2.522)

-0.0057**
(-2.331)
-0.0658
(-1.623)

-0.0075
(-1.298)
-0.192**
(-2.380)

0.0579
(0.780)
-0.137
(-1.074)

0.0269
(0.756)
-0.012
(-0.169)

0.0240
(0.287)
-0.212
(-1.548)

Industry Median Leveraget-1

0.0797
(1.342)

-0.0061
(-0.128)

0.111
(1.626)

Abnormal AR

0.0315*
(1.911)

0.0234**
(2.311)

-0.0059
(-0.318)

1,250
0.780
Yes
Yes

1,250
0.473
Yes
Yes

1,250
0.723
Yes
Yes

BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE
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Table 9
Analysis of leverage changes of benchmark suppliers.
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage using lagged supplier firm controls for
benchmark suppliers whose customers did not file for bankruptcy; the benchmark sample has all
supplier-customer pairs in the same industries as the treatment firms. In Model (1), the dependent
variable is total book leverage. In Model (2), the dependent variable is short-term debt to total
book assets. In Model (3), the dependent variable is long-term debt to total book assets.
BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s
Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year
of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a
dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size
is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property,
plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets
to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. Heteroskedasticrobust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.

BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1
Industry Median Leveraget-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

(1)
Total Debt/TA

(2)
STD/TA

(3)
LTD/TA

0.0261
(1.302)
0.0159
(0.673)
0.0268
(0.728)

0.0075
(0.530)
0.0272*
(1.769)
0.0405*
(1.785)

0.0111
(0.543)
-0.0120
(-0.504)
-0.0143
(-0.430)

0.0897***
(6.177)
0.00268
(0.409)

0.0162*
(1.676)
0.00286
(0.886)

0.0678***
(5.479)
-0.0059
(-1.585)

-0.360***
(-4.885)
0.174**
(2.224)

-0.0641
(-1.533)
0.123***
(3.098)

-0.248***
(-4.589)
0.0635
(0.860)

-0.0758
(-0.636)
-0.0911
(-1.042)

-0.0202
(-0.286)
0.0574
(0.922)

-0.0191
(-0.184)
-0.152
(-1.412)

730
0.776
Yes
Yes

730
0.584
Yes
Yes

730
0.715
Yes
Yes
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Table 10
Impact of industry concentration on supplier leverage responses to customer distress.
This table reports the impact of supplier industry concentration on supplier book leverage for the
sample of suppliers whose distressed customers remerged after Chapter 11 filing. BeforeFiling is
a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing,
and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s
Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy
variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise.
HighSuppHefIndex is a dummy variable that receives the value of 1 if the supplier industry
Herfindahl index in the two years before customer bankruptcy filing is in the top 25% of
Herfindahl Indices, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA
divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.
Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D
expense divided by total assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The
symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on pvalues.
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BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
BeforeFiling*HighSuppHefIndex
Transition*HighSuppHefIndex
AfterFiling*HighSuppHefIndex
Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1
Industry Median Leveraget-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

0.0663***
(3.612)
0.0418**
(2.434)
0.0258
(1.215)
-0.0454*
(-1.721)
-0.0222
(-1.035)
-0.0435*
(-1.752)
0.0398***
(4.287)
-0.0170***
(-4.095)
-0.206***
(-3.230)
0.0535
(0.814)
-0.179
(-1.619)
0.119**
(1.989)
1,350
0.782
Yes
Yes
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Table 11
Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers with distressed customers that are liquidated or
become unimportant.
This table reports regression results of supplier book leverage on a before filing dummy and
lagged supplier firm controls. The sample includes suppliers whose customers liquidated after
filing for Chapter 11 (column1) or whose customers either liquidated or become unimportant
(column 2) after the Chapter 11 filing. BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –
2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy
variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2,
and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent
years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total
assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book
is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by
total assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and *
indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.

BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1
Industry Median Leveraget-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

(1)

(2)

-0.0209
(-0.573)
0.0596
(1.138)
0.0496
(0.713)

-0.0010
(-0.033)
0.0439
(1.137)
0.0109
(0.218)

-0.0157
(-0.724)
-0.0125**
(-2.380)

0.0052
(0.261)
-0.0221***
(-5.829)

-0.0033
(-0.051)
0.0500
(0.306)

0.0143
(0.236)
-0.137
(-1.025)

0.0424
(0.203)
0.112
(0.635)

-0.0718
(-0.373)
-0.0982
(-0.667)

248
0.734
Yes
Yes

363
0.715
Yes
Yes
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Table 12
Probability of reorganization.
This table presents the results of forecasting the probability of reorganization using the model in
Kolay, Lemmon and Tashjian (2015). The table reports summary statistics of the calculated
probability of reorganization for all customers that filed for Chapter 11 in our sample during the
period 1980-2013. The customers were divided into two groups: firms that reorganized and a
second group of firms that were either liquidated or acquired. Panel A reports summary statistics
for the customers, where Reorganization = 1 and Liquidation/M&A = 0. Panel B presents the
confusion matrix.
Panel A. Predicted probability of reorganization
(Reorganize = 1, Liquidate/M&A = 0)
Reorganized
Customers

Liquidated/M&A
Customers

t-test of
difference

Mean

0.607

0.445

4.239***

Median

0.600

0.434

Std. Dev.

0.137

0.147

Min

0.305

0.242

Max

0.879

0.719

35

22

N

Panel B. Confusion matrix
Predicted
Actual

Reorganization

Liquidation

Reorganized

27 (79%)

7 (21%)

Liquidated

8 (35%)

15 (65%)
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Table 13
Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers with distressed customers that are predicted to be
reorganized.
This table reports analysis of book leverage of suppliers whose distressed customers are
predicted to be reorganized rather than liquidated using the model in Kolay, Lemmon and
Tashjian (2015). BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to
the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set
to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise.
AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero
otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets.
Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the
market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total
assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.

BeforeFiling
Transition
AfterFiling
Firm Sizet-1
Market-to-Bookt-1
Profitabilityt-1
Tangibilityt-1
R&D-to-Assetst-1
Industry Median Leveraget-1

No. of observations
R-squared
Year FE
Supplier FE

0.0436***
(2.948)
0.0466***
(3.012)
0.0157
(0.838)
0.0440***
(5.412)
-0.0168***
(-5.509)
-0.197***
(-4.157)
0.0654
(1.040)
-0.188*
(-1.901)
0.138**
(2.502)
1,353
0.781
Yes
Yes
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